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Book Reviews
Daniel Byers. Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription 
in the Second World War. Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2016. Pp. xviii + 324.
Most students of Canada’s participation in the Second World War 
will be aware that our army overseas was comprised primarily of 
volunteers, but that conscripts had to be sent to Europe late in the 
war due to higher-than-expected casualties after the Allied invasion 
of France. Nothing more than the title of The Conscription Crisis of 
1944, a classic from 1961,1 is needed to indicate how momentous this 
decision was at the time, not only for the army but for the nation 
as a whole. But the title of that book, or the exasperated outburst 
by Minister of Munitions and Supply C.D. Howe at the height of the 
cabinet debates on the subject, “Conscription or no Conscription, 
but for God’s sake let us make up our minds” (quoted on p. 228), 
can lead to the impression that conscription was only introduced in 
1944. However, with initial training lasting four months in basic and 
advanced training centres, pulling men off the streets in November 
of 1944 was not going to meet the army’s immediate need for 
reinforcements.
Nevertheless, the government was able to order the immediate 
dispatch of 16,000 trained personnel because conscription already 
existed in Canada, and had done so since the passage in 1940 of the 
National Resources Mobilization Act, or NRMA. These NRMA men, 
of whom almost 160,000 were to serve during the war, formed an army 
1  R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1961).
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parallel to, and in many ways separate from, the volunteer army. 
Daniel Byers, associate professor of history at Laurentian University, 
has chosen to refer to them as a “zombie army,” in reference to the 
ubiquitous contemporary nickname for the conscripts inspired by the 
unthinking automatons of films of the 1930s. The NRMA originally 
forbade conscripts from serving overseas, therefore most of them were 
assigned to home defence units, but in 1942, during the so-called 
“first conscription crisis,” the geographic limitation contained in the 
act was lifted after a national plebiscite.2 After that, conscripts were 
posted further and further afield in the Western Hemisphere, including 
participation in the U.S.-led invasion of Kiska in the Aleutians, until 
the decision was finally taken to use them in Europe.
Canadian conscription in the Second World War has formed the 
subject matter, in whole or in part, of a number of fine monographs 
and articles in the decades since 1945.3 As Byers points out in his 
introduction, however, these have directed their attention mainly to 
the political wrangling surrounding the decision to send conscripts 
to Europe as reinforcements, as well as to the related question of 
whether the pressure exerted by many in the army’s hierarchy in 
favour of doing so constituted a “revolt of the generals.” In Zombie 
Army, the focus is primarily on the workings of the nationwide 
system of conscription set up under the NRMA and the experiences 
of the conscripts once they entered that system. It is certainly the 
first monograph that can make that claim, and as such represents a 
major contribution to the historiography of this subject. In addition, 
however, constituting a second emphasis almost as important as the 
first, Byers has chosen to re-examine the high-level deliberations and 
debates on conscription, not only in late 1944 but throughout the 
war, through the lens of the NRMA, revealing the ways in which the 
presence of tens of thousands of trained personnel at home affected 
decisions regarding the volunteer army overseas. This two-pronged 
approach has allowed Byers to produce by far the most complete 
2  It was at this time that Prime Minister Mackenzie King uttered his famous 
statement, “not necessarily conscription, but conscription if necessary” (quoted on p. 
109); once again giving the impression that conscription in Canada did not yet exist.
3  Mostly in part, as far as monographs are concerned: besides Dawson, the only other 
book that I am aware of that deals exclusively with this subject is J.L. Granatstein’s 
Conscription in the Second World War: A Study in Political Management (Toronto: 
Ryerson Press, 1969), which does not, however, exceed eighty-five pages of main text.
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account to date of conscription in Canada during the Second World 
War.
After a brief introduction, the first chapter gives an overview of 
Canadian conscription up to 1939, focusing primarily on the First 
World War, providing essential context for the extreme reluctance of 
the Mackenzie King government to send conscripts overseas during 
the second. Of the seven remaining chapters, some deal with the 
NRMA, others deal with policy planning for the army overseas, and 
some discuss both. With respect to the NRMA, the author’s sources 
are primarily archival—including a complete reading of the war 
diaries of all the basic training centres for the period 1940-42—but he 
has also included material drawn from novels, memoirs, and letters 
written by former conscripts, oral histories, and even some interviews 
to provide first-hand accounts. We learn that conscription began as 
a universal programme of thirty-day training camps set up across 
the country, but the limited military usefulness of this scheme led to 
the decision to increase the training period to four months, thereby 
aligning it with the programme for volunteers for overseas service. 
With volunteers and conscripts training side by side, many NRMA 
men decided to “go active,” but for those that did not, a combination 
of blandishments and threats were often employed to get them to 
change their minds. Some of this included verbal and even physical 
abuse;4 one case, in which a conscript was beaten unconscious, led to 
a formal court of inquiry.
In those parts of the book dealing with manpower planning, 
Byers writes for the beginner, providing a great deal of background 
to bring the reader new to the subject up to speed. There is no 
need to reinvent the wheel here, and so the author relies primarily 
upon published secondary accounts, some of them decades old, for 
this purpose. But when he comes to discussing the importance of 
the NRMA in the planning of policy for the overseas divisions, his 
sources are almost exclusively archival, including the minutes of the 
Cabinet War Committee and the Mackenzie King diaries. He explains 
that in the early days conscription allowed the army to release 
4  The methods described here are reminiscent of the treatment meted out during 
the First World War to conscientious objectors whose requests for exemption were 
denied; see Amy J. Shaw, Crisis of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in Canada 
during the First World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 
89-97 for the worst examples. 
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members of the militia, who had been mobilised for the protection of 
key infrastructure, back to their civilian employment. As increasing 
numbers of conscripts were assigned to home defence duties, more and 
more volunteers for the “Active” army were able to be released from 
these units and sent overseas. Moreover, voluntarism was high at first 
among the NRMA men, but as early as 1943 it was becoming clear 
that the supply of volunteers for overseas service, whether conscripted 
first or not, would soon be exhausted. By this time, what Byers refers 
to as the “big army” of five divisions in Europe was already in place, 
the planning for which, much earlier in the war, had been based on 
overly optimistic estimates of the capacity of the voluntary system 
to fill its ranks. Action in Sicily, Italy, and northwest Europe quickly 
demonstrated that the army’s casualty estimates were also overly 
optimistic, and before the end of 1944 the prime minister was forced 
to repudiate his 1939 promise to the country that conscription would 
not be imposed for service overseas.5
Events after the decision to send conscripts to Europe are treated 
in an epilogue. There it is explained that, with almost all of those 
in the country willing to volunteer having done so by late 1944, the 
ranks of the conscripted at that stage were comprised primarily of 
those most adamant in their refusal to serve overseas. The news of 
the government’s decision to employ conscripts as reinforcements was 
greeted in some cases by protest marches and sit-down strikes—
technically, a state of mutiny—by conscripts on home defence duties. 
Photos from these incidents grace the front and back covers of the 
book. Of the 16,000 conscripts earmarked as reinforcements, over one-
quarter never made it to the troopships, having absented themselves 
in transit. Of the 9,667 who reached the front, two-thirds did so 
after hostilities had ended. Only 2,463 served in operational units, of 
whom 232 were wounded, 69 were killed, and 13 taken prisoner.
As I have come to expect from the books in the Studies in 
Canadian Military History series from UBC Press and the Canadian 
War Museum, the standard of production is very high, with virtually 
no typographical errors. A very helpful aid to the reader is the full 
text of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, printed as 
an appendix. It should be pointed out that there is no bibliography, 
with sources cited in full only on first appearance in the 63 pages 
5  “So long as this government may be in power, no such measure will be enacted” 
(quoted on p. 34). 
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of endnotes. A more substantive omission from this study is an 
examination of the experiences of those conscripts that eventually 
made it to the front lines. With a subtitle of The Canadian Army 
and Conscription in the Second World War, I certainly expected a 
more serious treatment of that topic than the one and a half pages 
devoted to it in the epilogue. Although Byers assures us that “there is 
very little evidence with which to asses their [the conscripts’] combat 
performance” (p. 237), Patrick Dennis’s new Reluctant Warriors, 
examining the role of Canadian conscripts during the “Hundred 
Days” offensive of 1918,6 suggests that more could be done. But 
Dennis’s book, as well as a number of other recent monographs on 
specialised aspects of manpower in the First World War, suggests 
that the time may have passed when it would have been reasonable 
to expect the whole story in one volume with respect to conscription 
in the Second World War. In any case, there is a certain justice in 
ending the narrative where Byers did. Once the NRMA men made 
it to Europe, the policy was to break them up and send them to the 
front as anonymously as possible. Serving as individuals alongside 
members of the volunteer army, where they would “stand, or fall . . . 
on how they prove themselves as soldiers,”7 by no means did they any 
longer constitute a “zombie army.”
brian bertosa, independent researcher
6  Patrick M. Dennis, Reluctant Warriors: Canadian Conscripts and the Great War 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017).
7  General H.D.G. Crerar, commander, First Canadian Army, quoted on p. 236.
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